A Dogma of Naturalism
Metaphilosophy 43 (5):551-566 (2012)
| Abstract | One of the major historical effects of Quine’s attacks upon the analytic-synthetic distinction has been to popularise the belief that philosophy is continuous with science. Currently, most philosophers believe that such continuity is an inevitable consequence of naturalism. This article argues that though Quine’s semantic holism does imply that there is no sharp distinction between truths discoverable by scientific investigation and truths discoverable by philosophical investigation, it also implies that there is a perfectly sharp and natural distinction between natural science and naturalistic philosophy. | |||||||||
| Keywords | analytic continuity distinction holism limits method naturalism Quine continuous science | |||||||||
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