David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Peter. Singer (ed.), Animal Liberation. Avon Books (1990)
Do animals other than humans feel pain? How do we know? Well, how do we know if anyone, human or nonhuman, feels pain? We know that we ourselves can feel pain. We know this from the direct experience of pain that we have when, for instance, somebody presses a lighted cigarette against the back of our hand. But how do we know that anyone else feels pain? We cannot directly experience anyone else's pain, whether that "anyone" is our best friend or a stray dog. Pain is a state of consciousness, a "mental event", and as such it can never be observed. Behavior like writhing, screaming, or drawing one's hand away from the lighted cigarette is not pain itself; nor are the recordings a neurologist might make of activity within the brain observations of pain itself. Pain is something that we feel, and we can only infer that others are feeling it from various external indications
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Mark D. Sullivan (2002). The Meaning of Facial Expressions of Pain Lies in Their Use, Not in Their Reference. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):472-473.
P. Harrison (1991). Do Animals Feel Pain? Philosophy 66 (January):25-40.
Nico H. Frijda (2002). What is Pain Facial Expression For? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):460-460.
Paul Noordhof (2001). In Pain. Analysis 61 (2):95-97.
Kevin Reuter (2011). Distinguishing the Appearance From the Reality of Pain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):94-109.
Richard Holton & Rae Langton (1998). Empathy and Animal Ethics. In Dale Jamieson (ed.), Singer and His Critics. Oxford.
Roy W. Perrett (1997). The Analogical Argument for Animal Pain. Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (1):49-58.
Tim Crane (2003). The Intentional Structure of Consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 33-56.
Donald F. Gustafson (2000). On the Supposed Utility of a Folk Theory of Pain. Brain and Mind 1 (2):223-228.
Peter Alward (2004). Mad, Martian, but Not Mad Martian Pain. Sorites 15 (December):73-75.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads192 ( #2,264 of 1,088,396 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #20,058 of 1,088,396 )
How can I increase my downloads?