David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):331 - 352 (2005)
For millennia, philosophers have speculated about the origins of ethics. Recent research in evolutionary psychology and the neurosciences has shed light on that question. But this research also has normative significance. A standard way of arguing against a normative ethical theory is to show that in some circumstances the theory leads to judgments that are contrary to our common moral intuitions. If, however, these moral intuitions are the biological residue of our evolutionary history, it is not clear why we should regard them as having any normative force. Research in the neurosciences should therefore lead us to reconsider the role of intuitions in normative ethics.
|Keywords||brain imaging David Hume ethics evolutionary psychology Henry Sidgwick Immanuel Kant intuitions James Rachels John Rawls Jonathan Haidt Joshua D. Greene|
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Guy Kahane (2011). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments. Noûs 45 (1):103-125.
Travis Timmerman (2015). Sometimes There is Nothing Wrong with Letting a Child Drown. Analysis 75 (2):204-212.
John Bengson (2013). Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.
Guy Kahane (2012). On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology. Mind and Language 27 (5):519-545.
James Andow (2015). Thin, Fine and with Sensitivity: A Metamethodology of Intuitions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-21.
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