Emotion and Reliability in Moral Psychology
Emotion Review 3 (3):288-289 (2011)
| Abstract | Instead of arguing about whether moral judgments are based on emotion or reason, moral psychologists should investigate the reliability of moral judgments by checking rates of framing effects in different kinds of moral judgments under different conditions by different people. | |||||||||
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