Free Thinking for Expressivists

Philosophical Papers 37 (2):263-287 (2008)
This paper elaborates and defends an expressivist account of the claims of mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. In response to objections from Zangwill and Jenkins it is argued that the expressivist 'internal reading' of such claims is compatible with their conceptual status and that the only 'external reading' available doesn't commit expressivisists to any sort of subjectivism. In the process a 'commitment-theoretic' account of the semantics of conditionals and negations is defended
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DOI 10.1080/05568640809485222
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PhilPapers Archive Neil Sinclair, Free Thinking for Expressivists
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