Intuitions, heuristics, and utilitarianism

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):560-561 (2005)
Abstract
A common objection to utilitarianism is that it clashes with our common moral intuitions. Understanding the role that heuristics play in moral judgments undermines this objection. It also indicates why we should not use John Rawls' model of reflective equilibrium as the basis for testing normative moral theories.
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