Is moral phenomenology unified?

Abstract
In this short paper, I argue that the phenomenology of moral judgment is not unified across different areas of morality (involving harm, hierarchy, reciprocity, and impurity) or even across different relations to harm. Common responses, such as that moral obligations are experienced as felt demands based on a sense of what is fitting, are either too narrow to cover all moral obligations or too broad to capture anything important and peculiar to morality. The disunity of moral phenomenology is, nonetheless, compatible with some uses of moral phenomenology for moral epistemology and with the objectivity and justifiability of parts of morality
Keywords Phenomenology  Moral phenomenology  Emotions  Fittingness  Demands  Approval  Harm
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Citations of this work BETA
Richard Joyce (2009). Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):53 - 75.
Joseph Lacey (2013). Moral Phenomenology and a Moral Ontology of the Human Person. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):51-73.
J. Jeremy Wisnewski (forthcoming). The Case for Moral Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
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