David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 23 (1):90–106 (2008)
The traditional philosophical doctrine of double effect claims that agents’ intentions affect whether acts are morally wrong. Our behavioral study reveals that agents’ intentions do affect whether acts are judged morally wrong, whereas the temporal order of good and bad effects affects whether acts are classified as killings. This finding suggests that the moral judgments are not based on the classifications. Our results also undermine recent claims that prior moral judgments determine whether agents are seen as causing effects intentionally rather than as side effects.
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References found in this work BETA
Marc Hauser (2006). Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong. Harper Collins.
F. M. Kamm (2007/2008). Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm. New York ;Oxford University Press.
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John Mikhail (2007). Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the Future. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):143 –152.
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Citations of this work BETA
James R. Beebe & Wesley Buckwalter (2010). The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect. Mind and Language 25 (4):474-498.
Toni Adleberg, Morgan Thompson & Eddy Nahmias (2014). Do Men and Women Have Different Philosophical Intuitions? Further Data. Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):615-641.
Chandra Sripada & Sara Konrath (2011). Telling More Than We Can Know About Intentional Action. Mind and Language 26 (3):353-380.
Joshua Knobe (2007). Reason Explanation in Folk Psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):90–106.
Ron Mallon (2008). Knobe Vs Machery: Testing the Trade-Off Hypothesis. Mind and Language 23 (2):247-255.
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