David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 152 (3):385-411 (2011)
This paper advances three necessary conditions on a successful account of sentential negation. First, the ability to explain the constancy of sentential meaning across negated and unnegated contexts (the Fregean Condition). Second, the ability to explain why sentences and their negations are inconsistent, and inconsistent in virtue of the meaning of negation (the Semantic Condition). Third, the ability of the account to generalize regardless of the topic of the negated sentence (the Generality Condition). The paper discusses three accounts of negation available to moral expressivists. The first—the dominant commitment account—fails to meet the Fregean Condition. The two remaining accounts—commitment semantics and the expression account—satisfy all three conditions. A recent argument that the dominant commitment account is the only option available to expressivists is considered and rejected.
|Keywords||Negation Expressivism Frege–Geach problem|
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Stephen Barker (2006). Truth and the Expressing in Expressivism. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. 299.
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Citations of this work BETA
Neil Sinclair (2012). Moral Realism, Face-Values and Presumptions. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):158-179.
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