Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (1996)
In Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, editors Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons bring together eleven specially commissioned essays by distinguished moral philosophers exploring the nature and possibility of moral knowledge. Each essay represents a major position within the exciting field of moral epistemology in which a proponent of the position presents and defends his or her view and locates it vis-a-vis competing views. The authors include established philosophers such as Peter Railton, Robert Audi, Richard Brandt, and Simon Blackburn, as well as newer voices in the field. Topics covered include moral skepticism, moral truth, projectivism, contractarianism, coherentism, feminist views, quasi-realism, and pragmatism. The lively and clear selections do not presuppose specialized knowledge of philosophy, and the philosophical vocabulary used throughout the anthology is uniform, in order to facilitate understanding by those not familiar with the field. The first chapter includes a sustained critical discussion of the major views represented in the following chapters, thereby furnishing beginning students with appropriate background to understand the selections. The volume is further enhanced by an index and an extensive bibliography. An excellent text for undergraduate and graduate courses, Moral Knowledge provides the most up-to-date work on moral knowledge and justification.
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Citations of this work BETA
Thomas Nadelhoffer & Adam Feltz (2008). The Actor–Observer Bias and Moral Intuitions: Adding Fuel to Sinnott-Armstrong's Fire. Neuroethics 1 (2):133-144.
Mark Timmons (2003). The Limits of Moral Constructivism. Ratio 16 (4):391–423.
Michael Ridge (2007). Expressivism and Epistemology: Epistemology for Ecumenical Expressivists. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):83–108.
Adam Lerner & Sarah‐Jane Leslie (2013). Generics, Generalism, and Reflective Equilibrium: Implications for Moral Theorizing From the Study of Language. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):366-403.
Mike Ridge (2009). Moral Assertion for Expressivists. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):182-204.
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