David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):158-179 (2012)
Many philosophers argue that the face-value of moral practice provides presumptive support to moral realism. This paper analyses such arguments into three steps. (1) Moral practice has a certain face-value, (2) only realism can vindicate this face value, and (3) the face-value needs vindicating. Two potential problems with such arguments are discussed. The first is taking the relevant face-value to involve explicitly realist commitments; the second is underestimating the power of non-realist strategies to vindicate that face-value. Case studies of each of these errors are presented, drawn from the writings of Shafer-Landau, Brink and McNaughton, and from recent work in experimental metaethics. The paper then considers weak presumptive arguments, according to which both realist and non-realist vindications of moral practice are possible, but the realist vindications are more natural. It is argued that there is no sense of ‘natural’ available that can make these arguments work. The conclusion is that all extant presumptive arguments for moral realism fail.
|Keywords||Metaethics Moral Realism Saving the Appearances Presumptive Arguments|
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References found in this work BETA
G. E. M. Anscombe (1958). Modern Moral Philosophy. Philosophy 33 (124):1 - 19.
Simon Blackburn (1988). Attitudes and Contents. Ethics 98 (3):501-517.
Simon Blackburn (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
Simon Blackburn (2002). Précis of Ruling Passions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):122–135.
Simon Blackburn (1998/2000). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
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