David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):254–260 (2008)
I argue that if David Lewis’ modal realism is true, modal realists from different possible worlds can fall in love with each other. I offer a method for uniquely picking out possible people who are in love with us and not with our counterparts. Impossible lovers and trans-world love letters are considered. Anticipating objections, I argue that we can stand in the right kinds of relations to merely possible people to be in love with them and that ending a trans-world relationship to start a relationship with an actual person isn't cruel to one's otherworldly lover.
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Merrihew Adams (1974). Theories of Actuality. Noûs 8 (3):211-231.
Robert Kraut (1987). Love De Re. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):413-430.
Mark Heller (2003). The Immorality of Modal Realism, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Let the Children Drown. Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):1 - 22.
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