Perception, inference, and the veridicality of natural constraints

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):395-396 (1999)
Pylyshyn's target article argues that perception is not inferential, but this is true only under a narrow construal of inference. A more general construal is possible, and has been used to provide formal theories of many visual capacities. This approach also makes clear that the evolution of natural constraints need not converge to the “veridical” state of the world.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X99542027
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Stephen P. Stich (1982). Beyond Inference in Perception. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:553 - 560.
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