David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Metaphilosophy 40 (3-4):567-581 (2009)
Many people believe that all human life is of equal value. Most of them also believe that all human beings have a moral status superior to that of nonhuman animals. But how are these beliefs to be defended? The mere difference of species cannot in itself determine moral status. The most obvious candidate for regarding human beings as having a higher moral status than animals is the superior cognitive capacity of humans. People with profound mental retardation pose a problem for this set of beliefs, because their cognitive capacities are not superior to those of many animals. I argue that we should drop the belief in the equal value of human life, replacing it with a graduated view that applies to animals as well as to humans
|Keywords||speciesism moral status ethics disability animals|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Eric Schwitzgebel & Mara Garza (2015). A Defense of the Rights of Artificial Intelligences. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):98-119.
Rachel Tillman (2013). Ethical Embodiment and Moral Reasoning: A Challenge to Peter Singer. Hypatia 28 (1):18-31.
Benjamin De Mesel (forthcoming). How Morality Can Be Absent From Moral Arguments. Argumentation:1-21.
Benjamin L. Curtis & Simo Vehmas (2016). A Moorean Argument for the Full Moral Status of Those with Profound Intellectual Disability. Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (1):41-45.
César Palacios-González (2015). Human Dignity and the Creation of Human–Nonhuman Chimeras. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 18 (4):487-499.
Similar books and articles
Roger Wertheimer (2007). The Relevance of Speciesism to Life Sciences Practices. In Fred Adams (ed.), Journal of Philosophical Research. Philosophy Document Center 27-38.
S. Matthew Liao (2012). The Genetic Account of Moral Status: A Defense. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):265-277.
Christopher Grau (2010). Moral Status, Speciesism, and Liao’s Genetic Account. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (3):387-96.
S. Matthew Liao (2010). The Basis of Human Moral Status. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2):159-179.
Stijn Bruers (2013). Speciesism as a Moral Heuristic. Philosophia 41 (2):489-501.
Oscar Horta (2010). What is Speciesism? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23 (3):243-266.
Bob Corbett, Bonnie Steinbock Comments and on and Criticisms of Peter Singer's "Speciesism" Argument.
Benjamin Sachs (2011). The Status of Moral Status. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):87-104.
David DeGrazia (2008). Moral Status as a Matter of Degree? Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):181-198.
Julie Tannenbaum & Agnieszka Jaworska (2013). The Grounds of Moral Status. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:0-0.
Oscar Horta (2013). Animals, Moral Status Of. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley
Tzachi Zamir (2006). Is Speciesism Opposed to Liberationism? Philosophia 34 (4):465-475.
Arthur Zucker (1996). Ferré: Organicistic Connectedness—But Still Speciesistic. Ethics and the Environment 1 (2):185 - 190.
Added to index2010-09-14
Total downloads269 ( #9,418 of 1,934,424 )
Recent downloads (6 months)78 ( #5,313 of 1,934,424 )
How can I increase my downloads?