The Desire‐Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything

Noûs 47 (4):680-696 (2012)
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Abstract

I argue that one intends that ϕ if one has a desire that ϕ and an appropriately related means-end belief. Opponents, including Setiya and Bratman, charge that this view can't explain three things. First, intentional action is accompanied by knowledge of what we are doing. Second, we can choose our reasons for action. Third, forming an intention settles a deliberative question about what to do, disposing us to cease deliberating about it. I show how the desire- belief view can explain why these phenomena occur when they occur, and why they don't when they don't

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Neil Sinhababu
National University of Singapore

Citations of this work

The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):511-534.
The role of imagination in decision-making.Bence Nanay - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (1):126-142.
How to Understand Rule-Constituted Kinds.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):7-27.

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References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press UK.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Practical knowledge.Kieran Setiya - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):388-409.
Intending.Robert Audi - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (13):387-403.

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