David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 45 (2):161-184 (2002)
Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore have recently criticized Davidson's methodology of radical interpretation because of its apparent failure to reflect how actual interpretation is achieved. Responding to such complaints, Davidson claims that he is not interested in the empirical issues surrounding actual interpretation but instead focuses on the question of what conditions make interpretation possible. It is argued that this exchange between Fodor and Lepore on one side, and Davidson on the other, cannot be viewed simply as a naturalist reaction to non-naturalist philosophical inquiry. Through a careful excavation of the hidden assumptions and commitments underlying this debate, we recognize a more serious disagreement over the intellectual obligations of naturalism; a position with a firm hold on current philosophical imaginations. In the process, we gain a new appreciation for how such commitments shape these naturalist positions, and recognize that any resolution to this specific debate will require careful attention to the divergent commitments that are its real source
|Keywords||Interpretation Methodology Naturalism Philosophy Davidson, D Fodor, J|
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
W. V. Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
Donald Davidson (1987). Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
Richard Rorty (1991). Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert Sinclair (2005). The Philosophical Significance of Triangulation: Locating Davidson's Non-Reductive Naturalism. Metaphilosophy 36 (5):708-728.
C. Mantzavinos (2014). Text Interpretation as a Scientific Activity. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):45-58.
Robert Sinclair (2006). A Less Radical Interpretation of Davidson and Quine. Dialogue 45 (1):107-124.
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Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1994). Is Radical Interpretation Possible? Philosophical Perspectives 8:101-119.
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Colin Mcginn (1986). Radical Interpretation and Epistemology. In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell
Jerry A. Fodor (1993). Is Radical Interpretation Possible? In Philosophical Perspectives. Hawthorne: De Gruyter 101-119.
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Jonathan Ellis (forthcoming). The Relevance of Radical Interpretation. In J. Malpas (ed.), The Hermeneutic Davidson. MIT Press
Nathaniel Goldberg (2008). Tension Within Triangulation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):363-383.
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