Zarathustra’s metaethics

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):278-299 (2015)
Nietzsche takes moral judgments to be false beliefs, and encourages us to pursue subjective nonmoral value arising from our passions. His view that strong and unified passions make one virtuous is mathematically derivable from this subjectivism and a conceptual analysis of virtue, explaining his evaluations of character and the nature of the Overman.
Keywords Nietzsche  subjectivism  virtue
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2015.1073576
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