Zarathustra's Metaethics

I argue that Nietzsche is an error theorist about morality whose positive evaluative claims concern a kind of subjective nonmoral value. Things have this subjective nonmoral value because of an agent's passions concerning them. This subjectivism and a historically popular view of the relation between value and virtue entail that virtuous agents have strong and unified passions. I show how this formula helps us understand Nietzsche's evaluations of character.
Keywords Nietzsche  subjectivism  virtue
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