Towards a computational theory of mood

Moods have global and profound effects on our thoughts, motivations and behavior. To understand human behavior and cognition fully, we must understand moods. In this paper I critically examine and reject the methodology of conventional ?cognitive theories? of affect. I lay the foundations of a new theory of moods that identifies them with processes of our cognitive functional architecture. Moods differ fundamentally from some of our other affective states and hence require distinct explanatory tools. The computational theory of mood I propose places them within the context of other mental phenomena and is consistent with the empirical data on moods
Keywords Affect  Cognition  Computation  Metaphysics  Mood
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/51.4.743
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Daniel M. Haybron (2005). On Being Happy or Unhappy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):287–317.
Laura Sizer (2010). Good and Good for You: An Affect Theory of Happiness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):133-163.
Craig Stephen Delancey (2006). Basic Moods. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):527-538.

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