Mind and Language 21 (1):108-135 (2006)
|Abstract||Arguments over whether emotions and moods are feelings have demonstrated confusion over the concept of a feeling and, in particular, what it is that feelings can—and cannot—do. I argue that the causal and explanatory roles we assign emotions and moods in our theories are inconsistent with their being feelings. Sidestepping debates over the natures of emotions and moods I frame my arguments primarily in terms of what it is emotions, moods and feelings do. I provide an analysis that clarifies the role feelings can play in our psychology that is consistent with current psychological and neurological data.|
|Keywords||Emotion Epiphenomenalism Feeling Intentionality Intuition Metaphysics Mind Mood Representation Damasio, Antonio R Le Doux, Joseph|
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