Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243 (2011)
|Abstract||This paper defends moral realism against Sharon Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” (this journal, 2006). I argue by separation of cases: From the assumption that a certain normative claim is true, I argue that the first horn of the dilemma is tenable for realists. Then, from the assumption that the same normative claim is false, I argue that the second horn is tenable. Either way, then, the Darwinian dilemma does not add anything to realists’ epistemic worries.|
|Keywords||Darwinism Moral Realism Moral Scepticism Moral Epistemology|
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