David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Inquiry 29 (June):187-201 (1986)
What is needed today is a biologically grounded explanation of behavior, one that moves beyond the so?called mind?body problem. Yet no solution will be found by philosophers who refuse to learn about how brains and bodies work, or by neuroscientists pursuing experimental research based on outmoded or blatantly anti?biological theories. Churchland's book proposes a solution: to come by a unified theory of the mind?brain philosophers have to work together with neuroscientists. Yet Churchland's vision of a unified theory is based on an assumption that, while widely held, may not adequately reflect brain functioning in the production of behavior, namely, the assumption that brain processes represent. The present paper proposes an alternative view, suggesting that patterns of neural activity do not ?represent? anything, that brains do not ?read? or ?transform? representations, and that brains do not require representations to produce goal?directed behavior. Representations are replaced by self?organizing neural processes that achieve a certain end?state of interaction between the organism and its environment in a flexible and adaptive manner. Some of the implications of this view for neuroscientific research and the philosophy of mind are outlined
|Keywords||Behavior Representation Science Transformation Churchland, P|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (ed.) (1981). Imagery. MIT Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Stephen M. Kosslyn (1980). Image and Mind. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Christine A. Skarda & Walter J. Freeman (1987). How Brains Make Chaos in Order to Make Sense of the World. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (2):161.
Iris Rooij, Raoul M. Bongers & F. G. Haselager (2002). A Non‐Representational Approach to Imagined Action. Cognitive Science 26 (3):345-375.
Ronald Rosenfeld, David S. Touretzky & Boltzmann Group (1987). Connectionist Models as Neural Abstractions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (2):181.
James S. Uleman & Jennifer K. Uleman (1990). Unintended Thought and Nonconscious Inferences Exist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):627-628.
A. Babloyantz (1987). Chaotic Dynamics in Brain Activity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (2):173.
Similar books and articles
A. Charles Catania (2003). Why Behavior Should Matter to Linguists. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):670-672.
William D. Ross (1998). Filling-in While Finding Out: Guiding Behavior by Representing Information. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):770-771.
Walter Glannon (2011). Brain, Behavior, and Knowledge. Neuroethics 4 (3):191-194.
Damian Keil & Keith Davids (2000). Lifting the Screen on Neural Organization: Is Computational Functional Modeling Necessary? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):544-545.
Martin Sereno (1986). A Program for the Neurobiology of Mind. Inquiry 29 (June):217-240.
Aarre Laakso & Garrison W. Cottrell (2000). Content and Cluster Analysis: Assessing Representational Similarity in Neural Systems. Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):47-76.
John Bickle (1997). From Sensory Neuroscience to Neurophilosophy: Reflections on Llinas and Churchland's Mind-Brain Continuum. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):523-530.
Andreas Keil & Thomas Elbert (2000). Physiological Units and Behavioral Elements: Dynamic Brains Relate to Dynamic Behavior. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (3):406-407.
Fred A. Keijzer (1998). Doing Without Representations Which Specify What to Do. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):269-302.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads6 ( #237,968 of 1,692,206 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #184,284 of 1,692,206 )
How can I increase my downloads?