Henry Sidgwick's Moral Epistemology

Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):491-519 (2010)
In this essay I defend the view that Henry Sidgwick’s moral epistemology is a form of intuitionist foundationalism that grants common-sense morality no evidentiary role. In §1, I outline both the problematic of The Methods of Ethics and the main elements of its argument for utilitarianism. In §§2-4 I provide my interpretation of Sidgwick’s moral epistemology. In §§ 5-8 I refute rival interpretations, including the Rawlsian view that Sidgwick endorses some version of reflective equilibrium and the view that he is committed to some kind of pluralistic epistemology. In§ 9 I contend with some remaining objections to my view
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2010.0002
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PhilPapers Archive Anthony Skelton, Henry Sidgwick's Moral Epistemology
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