Henry Sidgwick's Moral Epistemology
Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):491-519 (2010)
| Abstract | In this essay I defend the view that Henry Sidgwick’s moral epistemology is a form of intuitionist foundationalism that grants common-sense morality no evidentiary role. In §1, I outline both the problematic of The Methods of Ethics and the main elements of its argument for utilitarianism. In §§2-4 I provide my interpretation of Sidgwick’s moral epistemology. In §§ 5-8 I refute rival interpretations, including the Rawlsian view that Sidgwick endorses some version of reflective equilibrium and the view that he is committed to some kind of pluralistic epistemology. In§ 9 I contend with some remaining objections to my view | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesBart Schultz (ed.) (1992). Essays on Henry Sidgwick. Cambridge University Press.
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Anthony Skelton (2006). Henry Sidgwick's Practical Ethics: A Defense. Utilitas 18 (3):199-217.
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