Behaviorism at Fifty

New York,J. Norton Publishers (1974)
Abstract
Each of us is uniquely subject to certain kinds of stimulation from a small part of the universe within our skins. Mentalistic psychologies insist that other kinds of events, lacking the physical dimensions of stimuli, are accessible to the owner of the skin within which they occur. One solution often regarded as behavioristic, granting the distinction between public and private events and ruling the latter out of consideration, has not been successful. A science of behavior must face the problem of privacy by dealing with events within the skin in their relation to behavior, without assuming they have a special nature or must be known in a special way
Keywords Behaviorism (Psychology Philosophy
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Call number BF199
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References found in this work BETA
Max Black (1962). Models and Metaphors. Ithaca, N.Y.,Cornell University Press.
P. W. Bridgman (1959). The Way Things Are. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Slezak (2004). There's More to Vision Than Meets the Eye. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (7):291-293.
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