Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (2):121-144 (2004)
|Abstract||: Descartes' conceptual distinction (or distinctio rationis) is commonly understood to be a distinction created by the mind's activity without a foundation in re. This paper challenges this understanding partially based on a letter to an unknown correspondent in which Descartes claims not to admit distinctions without a foundation. He goes on to claim that his conceptual distinction is not a distinctio rationis ratiocinantis (i.e. a distinction of reasoning reason) but is something like a formal distinction or, more precisely, a distinctio ! rationis ratiocinatae (i.e. a distinction of reasoned reason). This remark is then explored through Descartes' other writings and his scholastic intellectual heritage. I conclude that Descartes' conceptual distinction just is a formal distinction understood as a distinctio rationis ratiocinatae as expressed in the works of Scotus, Suarez and Eustachius, and so it has a foundation in re in very much the same way as a formal distinction|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Andrew Botterell (2009). A Primer on the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):172-196.
Walter Ott (2006). Descartes and Berkeley on Mind: The Fourth Distinction. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 (3):437 – 450.
Keith Allen (2008). Mechanism, Resemblance and Secondary Qualities: From Descartes to Locke. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (2):273 – 291.
Joel A. Schickel (2011). Descartes on the Identity of Passion and Action. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (6):1067 - 1084.
Charles E. Jarrett (1977). Some Remarks on the 'Objective' and 'Subjective' Interpretations of the Attributes. Inquiry 20 (1-4):447 – 456.
Justin Skirry (2004). Does Descartes's Real Distinction Argument Prove Too Much? American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):399-423.
Frans Svensson (2011). Happiness, Well-Being, and Their Relation to Virtue in Descartes' Ethics. Theoria 77 (3):238-260.
David S. Oderberg (2009). The Non-Identity of the Categorical and the Dispositional. Analysis 69 (4):677-684.
Lisa Downing (2011). Sensible Qualities and Material Bodies in Descartes and Boyle. In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads20 ( #61,563 of 549,122 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,390 of 549,122 )
How can I increase my downloads?