David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 63 (1):1 - 34 (1985)
The theoretical construction and practical use of prior probabilities, in particular for systems having many degrees of freedom, are investigated. It becomes clear that it is operationally unsound to use mutually consistent priors if one wishes to draw sensible conclusions from practical experiments. The prior cannot usefully be identified with a state of knowledge, and indeed it is not so identified in common scientific practice. Rather, it can be identified with the question one asks. Accordingly, priors are free constructions. Their informal, ill-defined and subjective characteristics must carry over into the conclusions one chooses to draw from experiments or observations.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Wesley C. Salmon (1965). The Status of Prior Probabilities in Statistical Explanation. Philosophy of Science 32 (2):137-146.
R. D. Rosenkrantz (1973). Probability Magic Unmasked. Philosophy of Science 40 (2):227-233.
Festa, Roberto, Optimum Inductive Methods. A Study in Inductive Probability, Bayesian Statistics, and Verisimilitude.
John C. Harsanyi (1983). Bayesian Decision Theory, Subjective and Objective Probabilities, and Acceptance of Empirical Hypotheses. Synthese 57 (3):341 - 365.
Robin Hanson (2006). Uncommon Priors Require Origin Disputes. Theory and Decision 61 (4):319-328.
Bengt Autzen (2011). Constraining Prior Probabilities of Phylogenetic Trees. Biology and Philosophy 26 (4):567-581.
Joel D. Velasco (2008). The Prior Probabilities of Phylogenetic Trees. Biology and Philosophy 23 (4):455-473.
David H. Glass (2005). Problems with Priors in Probabilistic Measures of Coherence. Erkenntnis 63 (3):375 - 385.
Patrick Suppes (2007). Where Do Bayesian Priors Come From? Synthese 156 (3):441 - 471.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads9 ( #126,760 of 1,012,393 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,700 of 1,012,393 )
How can I increase my downloads?