Graduate studies at Western
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):149 – 154 (2009)
|Abstract||Kelly Trogdon  argues that priority monism—here, the view that only the world as a whole has fundamental properties—conflicts with the best extant accounts of intrinsicality. He then proposes an alternative account that is designed to be not only compatible with this view, but also independently plausible. But his account conflicts with priority monism as well, and incorrectly classifies various non-intrinsic properties.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jonathan Schaffer, Monism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Kelly Trogdon (2010). Intrinsicality for Monists (and Pluralists). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):555-558.
Kelly Trogdon (2009). Monism and Intrinsicality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):127 – 148.
M. Eddon (2011). Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):314-336.
D. Gene Witmer, William Butchard & Kelly Trogdon (2005). Intrinsicality Without Naturalness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):326–350.
Kelly Trogdon (2009). Physicalsim and Sparse Ontology. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):147-165.
Tomasz Bigaj (2010). Dispositional Monism and the Circularity Objection. Metaphysica 11 (1):39-47.
Hilan Bensusan & Manuel de Pinedo, Priority Monism, Physical Intentionality and the Internal Relatedness of All Things.
Uriah Kriegel (2012). Kantian Monism. Philosophical Papers 41 (1):23-56.
Rex Welshon (1999). Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):103-120.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads70 ( #15,078 of 739,347 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,538 of 739,347 )
How can I increase my downloads?