Spacetime and Conventionalism

Philosophy of Science 71 (5):950-959 (2004)
Abstract
A suggestion is made as to the core of the allegation of Salmon and others that simultaneity is non-conventional in Newtonian spacetime but conventional in Minkowski spacetime.
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Citations of this work BETA
Adrian Bardon (2011). Kant and the Conventionality of Simultaneity. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (5):845-856.
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