The content of science, the methodology of science and Hempel's models of explanation and confirmation
Philosophical Studies 94 (1-2):21-34 (1999)
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Similar books and articlesMary Hesse (1970). Theories and the Transitivity of Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 37 (1):50-63.
Carl G. Hempel (2001). The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel: Studies in Science, Explanation, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.
Rolf Eberle, David Kaplan & Richard Montague (1961). Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation. Philosophy of Science 28 (4):418-428.
Barbara Tuchanska (1992). What is Explained in Science? Philosophy of Science 59 (1):102-119.
G. H. Merrill (1979). Confirmation and Prediction. Philosophy of Science 46 (1):98-117.
Franz Huber (2008). Hempel's Logic of Confirmation. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):181 - 189.
Branden Fitelson (2006). The Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
C. A. Hooker (1968). Goodman, 'Grue' and Hempel. Philosophy of Science 35 (3):232-247.
Sidney Morgenbesser (1967). Philosophy of Science Today. New York, Basic Books.
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