Philosophical Studies 133 (1):111 - 130 (2007)
|Abstract||It is widely believed that shapes are intrinsic properties. But this claim is hard to defend. I survey all known theories of shape properties, and argue that each theory is either incompatible with the claim that shapes are intrinsic, or can be shown to be false.|
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