Information, belief, and causal role
In L. S. Moss, J. Ginzburg & M. de Rijke (eds.), Logic, Language, and Computation Vol 2. CSLI Press (1999)
| Abstract | This article has no associated abstract. (fix it) | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,664 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesDavid Pineda (2011). Non-Committal Causal Explanations. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):147-170.
Michael Strevens (2007). Why Represent Causal Relations? In Alison Gopnik & Laura Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, Computation. Oxford University Press.
Eric Schwitzgebel (2012). Mad Belief? Neuroethics 5 (1):13-17.
Roger White (2010). You Just Believe That Because…. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.
Barton Moffatt (2011). Conflations in the Causal Account of Information Undermine the Parity Thesis. Philosophy of Science 78 (2):284-302.
Fred Dretske (1990). Putting Information to Work. In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.
Curtis Brown (1992). Direct and Indirect Belief. Philosophy And Phenomenological Research 52 (2):289-316.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads12 ( #93,300 of 549,013 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,272 of 549,013 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
