David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ratio 12 (4):436–459 (1999)
This paper argues that normative claims are truth‐apt contents of cognition – propositions about what there is reason to believe, to do or to feel – but that their truth is not a matter of correspondence or representation. We do not have to choose between realism about the normative and non‐cognitivism about it. The universality of reasons, combined with the spontaneity of normative responses, suffices to give normative claims the distinctive link to a ‘convergence commitment’ which characterises any genuine judgement; an accurate epistemology of normative discourse need postulate no faculty of receptivity to a special domain of normative fact. Some general arguments for the view that cognitivism about a domain of discourse imposes realism about it are considered and rejected.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Carla Bagnoli (2000). Value in the Guise of Regret. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):169 – 187.
John Skorupski (2006). Propositions About Reasons. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):26–48.
Similar books and articles
Nick Zangwill (2009). Non-Cognitivism and Motivation. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan 416--24.
Adam M. Croom (2010). Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein's Rule Following Considerations. South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):286-309.
Stephen L. Mills (1999). Noncomputable Dynamical Cognitivism: An Eliminativist Perspective. Acta Analytica 22 (22):151-168.
Keith E. Stanovich (2005). On the Coexistence of Cognitivism and Intertemporal Bargaining. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):661-662.
John Gibson (2008). Cognitivism and the Arts. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):573-589.
Nick Zangwill (2011). Non-Cognitivism and Consistency. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (4):465-484.
Stanley G. Clarke (1986). Emotions: Rationality Without Cognitivism. Dialogue 25 (04):663-674.
John Deigh (1994). Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions. Ethics 104 (4):824-54.
John Haugeland (2004). Closing the Last Loophole: Joining Forces with Vincent Descombes. Inquiry 47 (3):254 – 266.
Josh Parsons (2012). Cognitivism About Imperatives. Analysis 72 (1):49-54.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads49 ( #68,863 of 1,725,863 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #348,716 of 1,725,863 )
How can I increase my downloads?