David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Artificial Intelligence and Society 22 (3):461-470 (2007)
Does connectionism spell doom for folk psychology? I examine the proposal that cognitive representational states such as beliefs can play no role if connectionist models - - interpreted as radical new cognitive theories -- take hold and replace other cognitive theories. Though I accept that connectionist theories are radical theories that shed light on cognition, I reject the conclusion that neural networks do not represent. Indeed, I argue that neural networks may actually give us a better working notion of cognitive representational states such as beliefs, and in so doing give us a better understanding of how these states might be instantiated in neural wetware.
|Keywords||folk psychology belief connectionism neural networks representation|
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References found in this work BETA
Paul M. Churchland (1981). Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90.
Andy Clark (1995). Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio (1994). Doing Without Representing. Synthese 101 (3):401-31.
Jeffrey L. Elman (1990). Finding Structure in Time. Cognitive Science 14 (2):179-211.
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