Propositions about reasons

European Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):26–48 (2006)
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2006.00242.x
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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