Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2009 (2009)
|Abstract||The paradox of desire is an objection to desire-satisfaction, or preferentist, theories of welfare. In a nutshell, the objection goes like this. I can certainly desire that I be badly oﬀ. But if a desire-satisfaction theory of welfare is true, then—under certain assumptions—the hypothesis that I desire that I be badly oﬀ entails a contradiction. So much the worse for desire-satisfaction theories of welfare.|
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