The Frege-Geach objection to expressivism: still unanswered

Analysis 72 (1):9-18 (2012)
I consider a recent attempt by Mark Schroeder in his book Being For to provide an expressivist semantics for the connectives, and I argue that it does not, as it claims, answer the ‘Frege-Geach objection&rsquo
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anr136
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Daniel Rothschild (2012). Expressing Credences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.
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