Diachronic Coherence and Radical Probabilism
Philosophy of Science 73 (5):959-968 (2006)
| Abstract | The question of diachronic coherence, coherence of degrees of belief across time, is investigated within the context of Richard Jeffrey’s radical probabilism. Diachronic coherence is taken as fundamental, and coherence results for degrees of belief at a single time, such as additivity, are recovered only with additional assumptions. Additivity of probabilities of probabilities is seen to be less problematic than additivity of first-order probabilities. Without any assumed model of belief change, diachronic coherence applied to higher-order degrees of belief yields the martingale property. | |||||||||
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Brian Skyrms (1996). The Structure of Radical Probabilism. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):285 - 297.
Luca Moretti & Ken Akiba (2007). Probabilistic Measures of Coherence and the Problem of Belief Individuation. Synthese 154(1) 154 (1):73 - 95.
Brian Skyrms (1987). Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics. Philosophy of Science 54 (1):1-20.
Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek (2007). What Are Degrees of Belief? Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.
Matthias Hild (1998). The Coherence Argument Against Conditionalization. Synthese 115 (2):229-258.
Lyle Zynda (2006). Radical Probabilism Revisited. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):969-980.
Matthias Hild (1999). The Diachronic Coherence of Ungraded Beliefs. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):225-242.
Hans Rott (1999). Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):387-412.
Brian Skyrms (2006). Diachronic Coherence and Radical Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):959-968.
Soshichi Uchii (1973). Higher Order Probabilities and Coherence. Philosophy of Science 40 (3):373-381.
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