Ken Binmore’s Natural Justice

Analyse & Kritik 28 (1):99-101 (2006)
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Abstract

I raise a few questions about key points in the argument of Natural Justice. 1. The pivotal role assigned to the theory of indefinitely repeated games appears to be both implausible and unnecessary. 2. The evolutionary foundations of the Nash bargaining solution are not completely secure, and its role in the account of interpersonal comparisons of utility is questionable. 3. Free renegotiation behind the veil of ignorance appears neither to have an evolutionary rationale nor to be a brute fact about the way men are.

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Brian Skyrms
University of California, Irvine

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