David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):321-342 (2009)
This article provides a phenomenological analysis of the difference between self-recognition and recognition of another, while referring to some contemporary neuroscientific studies on the rubber hand illusion. It examines the difference between these two forms of recognition on the basis of Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s work. It argues that both phenomenologies, despite their different views on inter-subjectivity, allow for the specificity of recognition of another. In explaining self-recognition, however, Husserl’s account seems less convincing. Research concerning the rubber hand illusion has confirmed that self-recognition involves more than an immediate experience of oneself. Merleau-Ponty’s later work, describing self-recognition as the result of assimilative identification, will be used to explain the possibility of illusion between one’s “hereness” and “thereness”. The possibility of this illusion is inherent to self-recognition, while it is lacking in recognition of another.
|Keywords||Self-recognition Recognition of another Rubber hand illusion Mirror image Identification|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
M. Costantini & P. Haggard (2007). The Rubber Hand Illusion: Sensitivity and Reference Frame for Body Ownership. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):229-240.
Frederique de Vignemont (2007). Habeas Corpus: The Sense of Ownership of One's Own Body. Mind and Language 22 (4):427-449.
Natalie Depraz (1997). La traduction de Leib : une crux phaenomenologica. Études Phénoménologiques 8 (26):91-109.
Shaun Gallagher (2007). Simulation Trouble. Social Neuroscience 2 (3-4):353â365.
Shaun Gallagher (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Marc Champagne (2013). Can “I” Prevent You From Entering My Mind? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):145-162.
Jenny Slatman & Guy Widdershoven (2009). Being Whole After Amputation. American Journal of Bioethics 9 (1):48 – 49.
Jenny Slatman (2012). Phenomenology of Bodily Integrity in Disfiguring Breast Cancer. Hypatia 27 (2):281-300.
Jenny Slatman (2011). The Meaning of Body Experience Evaluation in Oncology. Health Care Analysis 19 (4):295-311.
Similar books and articles
Freeman Lauren (2009). Recognition Reconsidered: A Re-Reading of Heidegger’s Being and Time §26. Philosophy Today 53 (1):85–99.
Lauren Freeman (2009). Recognition Reconsidered: A Re-Reading of Heidegger’s Being and Time §26. Philosophy Today 53 (1):85-89.
P. Canivez (2011). Pathologies of Recognition. Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (8):851-887.
Gabriele Wagner (2012). The Two Sides of Recognition: Gender Justice and the Pluralization of Social Esteem. Critical Horizons 12 (3):347 - 371.
Robert Sinnerbrink (2004). Recognitive Freedom: Hegel and the Problem of Recognition. Critical Horizons 5 (1):271-295.
Renante Pilapil (2012). From Psychologism to Personhood: Honneth, Recognition, and the Making of Persons. Res Publica 18 (1):39-51.
James Alexander Clarke (2009). Fichte and Hegel on Recognition. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (2):365-385.
Sune Lægaard (2010). Recognition and Toleration: Conflicting Approaches to Diversity in Education? Educational Philosophy and Theory 42 (1):22-37.
Bart van Leeuwen (2007). A Formal Recognition of Social Attachments: Expanding Axel Honneth's Theory of Recognition. Inquiry 50 (2):180 – 205.
Paul Ricœur (2005). The Course of Recognition. Harvard University Press.
Added to index2009-04-20
Total downloads52 ( #30,973 of 1,101,657 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #13,734 of 1,101,657 )
How can I increase my downloads?