David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):207 - 216 (2005)
There is a little known paradox the solution to which is a guide to a much more thoroughgoing solution to a whole range of classic paradoxes. This is shown in this paper with respect to Berry's Paradox, Heterologicality, Russell's Paradox, and the Paradox of Predication, also the Liar and the Strengthened Liar, using primarily the epsilon calculus. The solutions, however, show not only that the first-order predicate calculus derived from Frege is inadequate as a basis for a clear science, and should be replaced with Hilbert and Bernays' conservative extension. Standard second-order logic, and quantified propositional logic also must be substantially modified, to incorporate, in the first place, nominalizations of predicates, and whole sentences. And further modifications must be made, so as to insist that predicates are parts of sentences rather than forms of them, and that truth is a property of propositions rather than their sentential expressions. In all, a thorough reworking of what has been called 'logic' in recent years must be undertaken, to make it more fit for use
|Keywords||epsilon calculus logical paradoxes predicative nominalisations ‘that’-clauses|
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References found in this work BETA
W. C. Kneale (1962/1984). The Development of Logic. Oxford University Press.
Susan Haack (1978). Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge University Press.
A. N. Prior (1971). Objects of Thought. Oxford,Clarendon Press.
Barry Hartley Slater (2004). Ramseying Liars. Logic and Logical Philosophy 13:57-70.
Keith Simmons (1994). Paradoxes of Denotation. Philosophical Studies 76 (1):71 - 106.
Citations of this work BETA
Hartley Slater (2007). Logic and Grammar. Ratio 20 (2):206–218.
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