David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 57 (3):323–329 (2003)
Achille Varzi  has suggested a nice response to the familiar argument purporting to establish the existence of perfectly coinciding objects – objects which, if they existed, would trouble mereological extensionality and the “Minimalist View” of ontology. The trick is to defend Minimalism without tarnishing its status as a meta-principle: that is, without making any firstorder ontological claims. Varzi’s response, though seeming to allow for a comfortable indifference about metaphysical matters peripheral to Minimalism, is not general enough to stave off attacks on extensionality from more sophisticated corners. However, Varzi’s argument bears a kinship with a more general argument against coincident objects. I consider how such an argument sits with the meta-doctrinal status of Minimalism.
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References found in this work BETA
Lynne Rudder Baker (1997). Why Constitution is Not Identity. Journal of Philosophy 94 (12):599-621.
Susan Carey (2001). Cognitive Foundations of Arithmetic: Evolution and Ontogenisis. Mind and Language 16 (1):37–55.
Eric T. Olson (2001). Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):337-355.
Achille C. Varzi (2000). Mereological Commitments. Dialectica 54 (4):283–305.
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