David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio 23 (2):184-198 (2010)
It is shown that there are categorical differences between sentences and statements, which have the consequence in particular that there are no paradoxical cases of self-reference with the latter as there are with the former. The point corrects an extensive train of thought that Graham Priest has pursued over recent years, but also a much wider tradition in logic and the foundations of mathematics that has been dominant for over a century. That tradition might be broadly characterized as Formalist, or Nominalist, and the improved understanding of statements leads us instead into a more Realist approach and thereby contentful logic and mathematics.
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