From Morality to Virtue

Oxford University Press (1992)
Abstract
In this book, Slote offers the first full-scale foundational account of virtue ethics to have appeared since the recent revival of interest in the ethics of virtue. Slote advocates a particular form of such ethics for its intuitive and structural advantages over Kantianism, utilitarianism, and common-sense morality, and he argues that the problems of other views can be avoided and a contemporary plausible version of virtue ethics achieved only by abandoning specifically moral concepts for general aretaic notions like admirability and virtue. Although this study is not bound by particular Aristotelian doctrines, it places an Aristotelian emphasis on both self-benefiting and other-benefiting virtues. Slote criticizes Kantian and common-sense morality for internal incoherencies and for downgrading the moral individual and her well-being in some previously unnoticed ways. By contrast, this book defends a distinctive, intuitive, and symmetric ethical principle according to which we should balance self-concern with concern for others, but it also concludes that there is, contrary to utilitarianism, no single basis for status as a virtue nor any simple relation between the virtues and human well-being.
Keywords Ethics  Virtue  Common sense  Utilitarianism
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Call number BJ1012.S5165 1992
ISBN(s) 0195075625  
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Simon Keller (2007). Virtue Ethics is Self-Effacing. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):221 – 231.
Jarek Gryz (2011). On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (5):493-501.
Daniel Doviak (2011). A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):259-272.

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