Moral sentimentalism

In a way reminiscent of Hume's approach in the Treatise, a reviving moral sentimentalism can use the notion of empathy to ground both its normative account of moral obligation and its metaethical account of moral language. A virtuous person is empathically caring about others and expresses such feeling/motivation in her actions. But the judgment that something is right or good is also based in empathy, and the sentimentalist can espouse a form of moral realism by making use of a Kripkean reference-fixer theory of the role of feelings of approval and disapproval in moral judgment.
Keywords Ethics  Caring  Empathy
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Call number BJ1031.S585 2009
ISBN(s) 9780195391442   0195391446  
DOI 10.1023/B:ETTA.0000019982.56628.c3
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Jesse Prinz (2011). Against Empathy. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):214-233.
Aaron Simmons (2014). In Defense of the Moral Significance of Empathy. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (1):97-111.
Roger Crisp (2015). A Third Method of Ethics? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):257-273.

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