Spacetime and structuralism: Epistemological realism or relativized a priorism?

Abstract The subject of this essay is the relationship, within spacetime theories, between contemporary structural realism and Michael Friedman’s recent defense of the relativized a priori. Despite Friedman’s claims that the relativized a priori can account for the progress and rationality of science, such that the elements and structures of past successful theories will continue to be retained in future successful theories, our investigation will demonstrate that his theory does not have sufficient resources to make this guarantee. However, by exploiting the distinction between the epistemic and ontic versions of structural realism, the main content of Friedman’s relativized a priori can be retained within a structural realist position, and can thereby secure the successive progress and rationality of science without sacrificing the essential ideas put forward by Friedman.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,701
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Only published papers are available at libraries

    Similar books and articles

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    29 ( #42,388 of 549,090 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    3 ( #25,722 of 549,090 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums