David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):61 – 80 (1998)
In this article, I develop and defend a conception of psychological continuity that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of overlapping chains of strongly connected mental states. By recognizing the importance of the (narrative) interrelatedness of qualitatively dissimilar mental contents, as well as the role of the body in psychological continuity, I argue, serious problems confronting the orthodox view can be solved.
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Marc Slors (2010). Neural Resonance: Between Implicit Simulation and Social Perception. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):437-458.
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