Two conceptions of psychological continuity

Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):61 – 80 (1998)
In this article, I develop and defend a conception of psychological continuity that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of overlapping chains of strongly connected mental states. By recognizing the importance of the (narrative) interrelatedness of qualitatively dissimilar mental contents, as well as the role of the body in psychological continuity, I argue, serious problems confronting the orthodox view can be solved.
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DOI 10.1080/10001998018538690
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References found in this work BETA
A. Macintyre (1984). After Virtue. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 46 (1):169-171.

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Citations of this work BETA
Marc Slors (2004). Care for One's Own Future Experiences. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):183-195.
Igor Douven (1999). Marc Slors on Personal Identity. Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):143 – 149.

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