Why some machines may need qualia and how they can have them (Including a demanding new Turing test for robot philosophers.)

Abstract Many debates about consciousness appear to be endless, in part because of conceptual confusions preventing clarity as to what the issues are and what does or does not count as evidence. This makes it hard to decide what should go into a machine if it is to be described as 'conscious'. Thus, triumphant demonstrations by some AI developers may be regarded by others as proving nothing of interest because the system does not satisfy *their* definitions or requirements specifications.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,705
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Only published papers are available at libraries

    Similar books and articles
    Stevan Harnad (2003). Can a Machine Be Conscious? How? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):67-75.
    Dale Jacquette (1993). Who's Afraid of the Turing Test? Behavior and Philosophy 20 (21):63-74.
    B. Jack Copeland (2000). The Turing Test. Minds and Machines 10 (4):519-539.
    Benny Shanon (1989). A Simple Comment Regarding the Turing Test. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 19 (June):249-56.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-12-22

    Total downloads

    3 ( #202,056 of 549,198 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #63,397 of 549,198 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums