Confusion and dependence in uses of history
Synthese 184 (3):261-286 (2012)
| Abstract | Many people argue that history makes a special difference to the subjects of biology and psychology, and that history does not make this special difference to other parts of the world. This paper will show that historical properties make no more or less of a difference to biology or psychology than to chemistry, physics, or other sciences. Although historical properties indeed make a certain kind of difference to biology and psychology, this paper will show that historical properties make the same kind of difference to geology, sociology, astronomy, and other sciences. Similarly, many people argue that nonhistorical properties make a special difference to the nonbiological and the nonpsychological world. This paper will show that nonhistorical properties make the same difference to all things in the world when it comes to their causal behavior and that historical properties make the same difference to all things in the world when it comes to their distributions. Although history is special, it is special in the same way to all parts of the world | |||||||||
| Keywords | natural kinds historical kinds eternal kinds biological explanations psychological explanations essential properties historical properties Ruth Millikan Berent Enc Crawford Elder | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
  |
| External links |
 Try with proxy. Try with proxy. Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesMohan Matthen (forthcoming). Millikan's Historical Kinds. In Justine Kingsbury, Dan Ryder & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Ruth Millikan and her Critics.
Daniel Heussen (2011). When Functions and Causes Compete. Thinking and Reasoning 16 (3):233-250.
Ruth G. Millikan (1999). Historical Kinds and the "Special Sciences". Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):45-65.
Ruth G. Millikan (1999). Historical Kinds and the "Special Sciences". Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):45-65.
Crawford L. Elder (2007). Conventionalism and the World as Bare Sense-Data. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):261 – 275.
Suzanne Bliss & Jordi Fernández (2010). Program Explanation and Higher-Order Properties. Acta Analytica 25 (4):393-411.
Stefan Dragulinescu (2010). Diseases as Natural Kinds. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (5):347-369.
Crawford L. Elder (2008). Biological Species Are Natural Kinds. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):339-362.
Bence Nanay (2011). Three Ways of Resisting Essentialism About Natural Kinds. In J. K. Campbell & M. H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 8. MIT Press.
Lei Zhong (2011). A Unificationist Vindication of Moral Explanation. Philosophical Forum 42 (2):131-146.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-09-19Total downloads318 ( #371 of 549,198 )Recent downloads (6 months)46 ( #638 of 549,198 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
