A form of metaphysical realism

Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):301-315 (1995)
This essay defends a view which is near enough to Putnam's characterization of metaphysical realism for it to be called by the same name. Indeterminacy of reference is conceded, in the sense that there may be multiple reference relations, but it is denied that this implied belief in unknowable noumena. It is enough for metaphysical realism as conceived here, that there be at least one reference relation. The essay also argues against defining truth epistemically. Even a Peircean ideal theory might be false, in a contextual sense of might' stronger than that of the logically possible
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DOI 10.2307/2219652
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