Free will, praise and blame

Mind 70 (279):291-306 (1963)
In this article I try to refute the so-called "libertarian" theory of free will, and to examine how our conclusion ought to modify our common attitudes of praise and blame. In attacking the libertarian view, I shall try to show that it cannot be consistently stated. That is, my dscussion will be an "analytic-philosophic" one. I shall neglect what I think is in practice an equally powerful method of attack on the libertarian: a challenge to state his theory in such a way that it will fit in the modern biology and psychology, which are becoming increasingly physicalistic.
Keywords libertarianism  Mind argument  blameworthiness
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Coleen Macnamara (2011). Holding Others Responsible. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):81-102.

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