Philosophy 74 (3):431-437 (1999)
|Abstract||This article is a defence of the Fact-Value distinction against considerations brought up by Ruth Anna Putnam in three articles in Philosophy, especially her ‘Perceiving Facts and Values’ January 1998. I defend metaphysical realism about facts and anti-realism about values against Putnam' intermediate position about both and I relate the matter to the logic of imperatives. The motivations of scientists or historians to select fields of investigation are irrelevant to the objectivity of their hypotheses, and so is the goodness or badness of the social consequences of their work though these may affect their motivations.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ruth Anna Putnam (2000). Neither a Beast Nor a God. Social Theory and Practice 26 (2):177-200.
Alexei Angelides (2004). The Last Collapse? An Essay Review of Hilary Putnam's the Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Philosophy of Science 71 (3):402-411.
Narve Strand (2011). Putnam and the Political. Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (7):743-757.
Lars Bergström (2002). Putnam on the Fact-Value Dichotomy. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):117-129.
Ruth Anna Putnam (2001). Review of C. Hookway: Truth, Rationality and Pragmatism: Themes From Peirce. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):641-645.
Hilary Putnam & Ruth Anna Putnam (1998). The Real William James: Response to Robert Meyers. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 34 (2):366 - 381.
Hilary Putnam & Ruth Anna Putnam (1990). Epistemology as Hypothesis. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 26 (4):407 - 433.
Hilary Putnam & Ruth Anna Putnam (1993). Education for Democracy. Educational Theory 43 (4):361-376.
Ruth Anna Putnam (1985). Creating Facts and Values. Philosophy 60 (232):187-204.
Ruth Anna Putnam (1998). Perceiving Facts and Values. Philosophy 73 (1):5-19.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads58 ( #20,238 of 722,742 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,873 of 722,742 )
How can I increase my downloads?