Ruth Anna Putnam and the fact-value distinction

Philosophy 74 (3):431-437 (1999)
This article is a defence of the Fact-Value distinction against considerations brought up by Ruth Anna Putnam in three articles in Philosophy, especially her ‘Perceiving Facts and Values’ January 1998. I defend metaphysical realism about facts and anti-realism about values against Putnam' intermediate position about both and I relate the matter to the logic of imperatives. The motivations of scientists or historians to select fields of investigation are irrelevant to the objectivity of their hypotheses, and so is the goodness or badness of the social consequences of their work though these may affect their motivations.
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819199000480
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